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uropeans worry about their pensions. They 
also resist reforms. The technically easiest 
solution – to raise the retirement age – tends 
to run up against universal opposition. It is advisable 
to provide a wide reform package, offering trade-offs 
to various stakeholders. But finding the right balance 
is not easy. 
It is not surprising, then, that the European Union is 
now a diverse patchwork of reform attempts. 
Who is reforming and how?  
The Scandinavians, with their consensual approach 
to politics, have been at the forefront of reforms in 
the EU-15 area. In 1998, Sweden completely 
overhauled its pension system. The previous defined-
benefit scheme is gradually being replaced by a 
notional defined contribution (NDC) system.
1  
In 2005, Finland also overhauled its system, with a 
range of parametric adjustments that significantly 
improved the long-term sustainability of publicly 
mandated pensions.  
Then there is the biggest reform group, the post-
communist new member states. All of them, except 
the two richest, Slovenia and the Czech Republic, 
took the World Bank’s advice and implemented 
‘multi-pillar reforms’. Each
2 split its public pension 
                                                      
1 In an NDC system, people have individual accounts 
credited with their contributions. The account assets are 
only notional, financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. 
However, they are indexed to overall economic 
performance and demographic developments, so the 
system is actuarially fair. 
2 Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania and Slovakia. 
system into two pillars. The first remains a publicly 
administered, pay-as-you-go scheme. The second 
consists of privately managed accounts with assets 
invested in the financial market. 
These are, then, the far-reaching reforms that have 
been passed with relative ease. Elsewhere, measures 
have been far more cautious.  
Austria introduced (after strong trade union protests) 
a reform in 2003 which has helped to improve the 
sustainability of its pension system. Two years 
earlier, in 2001, Germany’s reform measures created 
a framework for a tier of funded accounts. The 
reform also cut down on some spending. However, 
the overall sustainability improvement is modest. 
Italy is trying to phase in an NDC pillar similar to 
Sweden’s, but the transition period spans decades, 
and this ongoing reform is complicated by 
continuing protests from the public.  
Most of Europe relies on piecemeal adjustments: 
tightening eligibility rules, closing off access to early 
pensions and providing financial disincentives 
(deductions from statutory pensions) to retiring early 
– as well as, conversely, premiums for retiring later 
than the statutory age. 
In the process, governments also do raise the 
retirement age. But, as said, this is a singularly 
unpopular measure and increments tend to be 
modest. 
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Myths and real options 
In the future, it will be necessary for people to work 
longer. Since World War II, longevity tended to 
advance much faster than adjustments to the 
statutory pension age.  Every successive generation 
could look forward to a longer retirement period than 
the previous one. This could not go on, even if we 
forget about other complicating factors, such as 
falling birth-rates or a slowdown in productivity 
growth. 
It is not difficult to envisage a reform that spreads 
the ‘cost’ of change evenly over working life 
cohorts, so that one generation does not have to be 
more dramatically affected than others.
3 After the 
reform is fully phased in, the new system should 
continuously ensure that people do not take out more 
in pensions then they paid in. 
How to achieve such a self-sustaining system? There 
is a range of choices that should lead to a better 
balance between what people pay in and what they 
take out.  
The pension formula could directly reflect this 
concern, that is, it could be as actuarially fair as 
possible. In fact, one of the most discernible trends 
in Europe today is to get rid of those pension 
formulas where a pension is calculated in relation to 
the wage in final years. Most people earn more at the 
end of their careers, and this can create overgenerous 
pensions as well as favour those with steeper earning 
profiles.  
So, pension systems are gradually more and more 
adjusted to take into account all contributions paid 
by the worker, not just the contributions in the final 
working years. This is now also technically easy, as 
governments today are capable of keeping 
contribution records over the entire career and thus 
provide the worker with a defined-contribution 
pension. 
Defined-contribution pensions can be achieved by 
directly changing the formula in the public pension 
system. This is what the Swedes have done.  
The alternative option is to convert the public 
pension system into a funded one, in which 
contributions are used to buy assets in the financial 
market.
4  
                                                      
3 See J. Myles (2002), “A new social contract for the 
elderly?”, in G. Esping-Andersen, D. Gallie, A. Hemerijck 
and J. Myles, Why We Need a New Welfare State, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
4 Two countries in the EU rely on a significant tier of 
funded, occupational pensions (beside the flat-rate public 
pension): the UK and the Netherlands. The Dutch system 
is more consolidated and dominated by large sectoral 
Such a conversion is complicated in countries with 
mature public schemes: it creates transitional deficits 
once contributions are diverted to the funded system. 
In its 1994 report Averting the Old-Age Crisis, the 
World Bank recommended that at least the countries 
that could bridge this financing gap by using 
proceeds from mass privatisation should split the 
public system into two ‘pillars’, the new one being 
funded with assets managed by private pension 
funds.  
The report helped decisively to draw the attention of 
the policy sphere in the new member states and 
beyond to the impending problems of financing 
pension payouts. 
However, there has also been a backlash among 
some leading academics against selling funded 
systems as a miracle cure for the problems connected 
with ageing.
5  
It still remains to be seen how the post-communist 
second-pillars will fare. The reforms were 
accompanied by glitzy advertising of the pension 
funds. They were sold on the argument that since 
pay-as-you-go systems are going to be affected by 
demographic developments, the problem needs to be 
solved by having a funded system. However, funded 
schemes do not operate outside the real economy; 
they, too are influenced by demographic and 
productivity effects. The argument is therefore 
misleading, but rhetorically effective. 
It remains to be seen whether these schemes deliver 
in terms of providing for more effective asset 
allocation in domestic economies or other touted 
benefits. They might. But caution is in order. Pay-as-
you-go schemes became so popular in the post-war 
period partly due to the fact that they are, to some 
extent, fraud-proof. They only redistribute 
contributions and do not accumulate lifetime savings 
of individuals.  
The post-communist schemes also remain fairly 
skeletal. In most cases, for example, detailed 
legislation still needs to be put in place to guide the 
annuitisation of assets. They also do not include any 
                                                                                       
pension funds. The Nordic states also have a relatively 
strong presence of mandatory or quasi-mandatory 
occupational funded pensions. 
5 See P. Diamond (1998), The Economics of Social 
Security Reform, NBER Working Paper 6719, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. See also 
P.R. Orszag and J.E. Stiglitz (1999), “Rethinking Pension 
Reform: Ten Myths About Social Security Systems”, 
paper presented at the conference on New Ideas About 
Old Age Security, World Bank, Washington, D.C. And N. 
Barr (2001), Reforming Pensions: Myths, Truths and 
Policy Choices, IMF Working Paper 139, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. Sustainable and Adequate Pensions | 3 
effective smoothing mechanisms to mitigate 
exposure of savers to financial market turbulences. 
Creating incentives 
Raising the statutory retirement age is one way of 
getting more people to work and continue supporting 
pension payouts rather than put claims on the 
system.  
Another way is to provide people with incentives to 
work longer voluntarily. Financial incentives work. 
Empirical research shows, however, that reforms 
have to implement higher premia for working longer 
than those provided by the reforms introduced since 
2000 to date. One AIM study
6 demonstrates that 
actuarial reduction of statutory pensions by 5 % 
points for each year of early retirement and even 
higher accruals for postponed retirement would 
increase retirement age by around 4.4 years on 
average. Improving well-being at work or improving 
health, on the other hand, would have minor effects. 
Other reports do, however, stress that a complex 
intervention in the labour market is needed to 
complement changes to pension formulas. For 
example, the UK Pensions Commission proposed in 
its 2006 final report a series of measures to help 
achieve a higher employment rate of old-age 
workers: 
•  Implementing and enforcing anti-age 
discrimination legislation. The legislation that 
came into force in the UK in 2006 following a 
European Commission directive makes age 
discrimination punishable if affecting workers 
before the statutory retirement age. However, 
beyond this mark it is possible to fire employees 
on the grounds of age.  
•  Ensuring good incentives for older workers to 
remain in the workforce. At present, UK retirees 
do not have the option of drawing on a part-time 
public pension while continuing working. 
•  Ensuring good financial incentives for employers 
to employ older workers. The Commission 
proposed to consider reducing employers’ 
national insurance contributions for old-age 
workers. 
•  Puttin more emphasis on occupational health. 
•  Putting more emphasis on the education and re-
training of older workers. 
                                                      
6 H. Piekkola (2008), Flexible Pension Systems – 
Postponed Retirement and Distributional Fairness, 
ENEPRI Research Report, Centre for European Policy 
Studies, Brussels (available at 
http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1742). 
Employment of old-age workers is one of the major 
social policy challenges facing Europe today. The 
Lisbon agenda included the target employment rate 
of 50% of older workers (55-64). We know now that 
this target is unlikely to be reached for the EU as a 
whole in 2010. But the employment rate of older 
workers  has actually been rising. In quite a few 
member states it even already exceeds the target. The 
EU Commissioner for Social Affairs Vladimir Spidla 
has recently sounded an upbeat note on the trend, 
noting that most countries will have achieved the rate 
with only a slight delay after the reference year of 
2010. He also called for vigorous efforts to 
implement a comprehensive active ageing strategy in 
the EU.
7   
Sustainability versus adequacy 
Many economics tools have been developed in the 
past two decades to help deal with the issues related 
to ageing and old-age income. Generational 
accounting came in 1980s. In the 1990s, earlier 
theoretical work was given full empirical 
implementation in dynamic programming rule and 
option value models.  
Increasingly complex models allow us to simulate 
the effects of pension reforms on aggregate pension 
expenditure and on the incomes of various 
population subgroups.  
At the same time, datasets have improved. 
Comprehensive replacement rates now take into 
account several sources of old-age income. This 
allows us to much better estimate old-age security 
than by looking at the simple ratio of wages and 
pensions. 
Accounting for changes in socio-economic 
conditions spanning little more than a few years is 
beyond the power of any economic model. However, 
projections give us important insights into how 
pension systems work and interact with the labour 
market. They allow us to see what the future would 
be like if certain conditions in the present would not 
change. 
And what we know is that the present rate of 
consumption of old-age people in some European 
countries is, under current economic conditions, not 
going to be possible for today’s younger generations. 
A paper produced as part of the AIM project clearly 
illustrates, using the example of selected EU 
                                                      
7 V. Spidla (2008), “Active ageing and the European 
Employment Strategy“, The Journal, AARP International 
(available at http://www.aarpinternational.org/ 
journal_sub/journal_sub_show.htm?doc_id=641352).  4 | Juraj Draxler 
countries, that young people will not be able to attain 
the rate of consumption of today’s pensioners.
8  
This poses two challenges. The first is the dilemma, 
discussed in the previous section, of reducing 
aggregate pension spending. The average pension 
will still probably remain fairly generous, given that 
EU economies will continue to be among the richest 
in the world. But the second challenge, from a social 
policy point of view, is to make sure that the change 
in pension rules does not have a dramatic impact on 
certain population groups. 
What are the groups that can be affected? The 
general trend in Europe is to phase out defined-
benefit pensions and implement formulas that are 
more defined-contribution. This will affect those 
with interrupted careers. For instance, women – as 
they have child-bearing and caring responsibilities. 
Research shows that applying unisex mortality tables 
is a much more effective way of compensating 
women than giving them pension credits for the 
periods when they are out of employment.
9  
Another particular concern, also expressed in AIM 
research, is that the new defined-contribution 
schemes in the post-communist member states will 
pose adequacy problems for future pensioners. With 
persistently high unemployment levels in the region 
and precarious jobs, many people are at risk of not 
saving enough. 
 
                                                      
8 M. Weale and E. Khoman (2008), Are we living beyond 
our means? A comparison of France, Italy, Spain and the 
United Kingdom, NIESR Discussion Paper No. 311, 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 
London (available at 
http://www.niesr.ac.uk/pdf/100408_94720.pdf). 
9 See the following AIM report: M. Belloni and E. 
Fornero (2008), Gender Difference in Retirement Income 
and Pension Policy – Simulating the Effects of Various 
DB and DC Schemes, ENEPRI Research Report, Centre 
for European Policy Studies, Brussels (available at 
http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1695). 
Conclusion – Is the future gloomy? 
As some member states have shown, very radical 
pension reforms are possible – if they are well-
planned and delivered after careful consultations. 
This is most notably the example of Sweden.  
Also, the ‘multi-pillar reforms’ in the new member 
states might deliver a good balance of sustainability 
and adequacy. However, in these and other cases, 
governments need to ensure that the system will not 
only provide sustainable average pensions, but also 
provide adequate cover to all. Governments will 
need to carefully monitor the developments and 
study projections of old-age income of various 
population groups.  
In addition, in the case of funded schemes, these 
should be properly regulated. Governance risks do 
not go away just because these schemes are 
relatively new and so far scandal-free. 
No. The future is not gloomy. Europeans do not have 
to face a pension crisis. All that is needed is that 
economists keep doggedly pointing out the risks of 
non-reforms and present policy-makers with clear, 
non-dogmatic options. Reforms are certainly 
possible and the range of reform paths diverse 
enough to give political leaders room for manoeuvre 
as they strive to achieve an optimal constellation of 
stakeholder interests. 